Turkish geopolitics, especially in the 16th century, was shaped by major power dynamics. After this century, it was affected by competition with Russia, and there were 12 wars with this state. The 10th war, the Crimean War, started with the Sinop Raid in 1853. For the first time after this war, the West went to the Black Sea with armed forces to protect the Ottomans. The West’s help to the Turks took away as much as it brought in return. Thus, the process entered into a cycle of “sovereignty and dependency” that has been repeated in 70-year cycles until today.

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Every period in which states miss technological transformations or seek external support due to a lack of self-confidence in the face of regional threats has resulted in the loss of strategic autonomy and the long-term survival of the homeland, even if it creates a short-term security illusion. Historical data prove that the pressure created by the 12 great wars between the Ottoman Empire and Russia pushed the Ottoman Empire into becoming a geopolitical protectorate under the West, but this protection was actually a process of invasion and colonization. The same situation repeated after 1946.

In short, whenever we trusted the West in our history, we were either invaded by it or placed into its sphere of influence like a colony. The Ottoman Empire missed both Industrial Revolutions. Therefore, in the 19th century, it entered the period as an empire that had 3 million square kilometers of land but could not transfer power and prosperity to these lands. The Ottoman Empire, which was gradually removed from the Mediterranean after the defeat of Lepanto in 1571, continued to be the biggest obstacle to the Russian Tsardom, which expanded in all directions, in its attempt to reach the warm seas, that is, the Mediterranean. Britain, which did not want a rival in the Mediterranean, always helped the Ottomans to stop this advance of Russia. In short, a great naval power, England, stood on the side of the Ottoman Empire against Russia, which wanted to reach the seas from the continent. The most important of these processes, shaped by Russia’s control of the Balkans, Crimea, and Caucasus basins and its struggle to descend to the Mediterranean, is undoubtedly the Sinop Raid of November 30, 1853, which led to the Crimean War, in which the Western states entered the war for the first time on the side of the Ottoman Empire.

The Sinop Raid of November 30, 1853, was not only a military defeat but also the suicide of an empire at sea that had missed the Industrial Revolution and rational guidance. This raid, in which 2,700 sailors were martyred, made the Ottoman Empire militarily and politically dependent on the West after the economic colonization process that had started with the Treaty of Balta Limanı in 1838. Although it went down in our history as a raid, it was not truly a surprise attack. The Russian navy did not suddenly arrive off the coast of Sinop. Preparations had been made for days. The navy, which had missed the Industrial Revolution, science, and rational thinking, was not ready for war. Instead of engaging in battle at sea, it chose to wait in port. In other words, the war was lost from the very beginning. In this raid, the Ottoman Fleet lost 2,700 sailors. It paved the way for the Anatolian Turks to be supported by European armed forces against the Russians for the first time.

The forces of Britain, France, and Piedmont-Sardinia, which sided with the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War, acted as a predecessor of modern NATO in the 19th century. However, this alliance was not a “defense aid,” but rather a strategy to use the Ottoman Empire as a buffer zone to prevent Russia from reaching the Mediterranean. These forces, which were stationed in Gallipoli and Istanbul, did not act like allies but as invasion armies that insulted the population and caused moral corruption. This mentality, which came under the guise of allies in 1853, later revealed its true intention—to disintegrate the Empire—with the Armistice of Mudros in 1918 and the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.

The Battle of Sinop,Ivan Aivazovsky(Public Domain)

Britain, France, and the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia declared war on Russia on March 12, 1854, as allies of the Ottoman Empire—that is, as a kind of NATO of the 19th century. This war was also part of the Great Game of the century. After this war, in which the Russians were defeated, the Ottoman Empire was accepted as part of so-called Europe with the Treaty of Paris signed in 1856; however, both the Ottoman and Russian naval powers were excluded from the Black Sea. Shipyards were closed.

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire turned into a real colony of Europe after the Crimean War, and its collapse became inevitable. Sultan Abdülmecit received the first foreign debt of the Ottoman Empire during this war. The European armies that had depolyed in the Gallipoli and Istanbul regions acted like invasion forces. The local population was exhausted by insults and immoral conduct. The Crimean War was actually the first rehearsal of the occupation of Anatolia, which began after the Armistice of Mudros on November 13, 1918. The geopolitical maneuver, initially intended to protect the Ottoman Empire from Russia, was repeated in 1878 when the British Navy entered the Sea of Marmara as the Russians reached Yeşilköy, and Egypt and Cyprus were lost in return. This process continued to repeat itself with Libya, the Balkans, and the First World War.

Source: Global Research