In October 1986, at a two-day summit in the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev nearly struck an agreement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The recent film “The Brink of War” revisits that extraordinary moment, showing two adversaries who recognized that nuclear war is unwinnable and that deterrence — relying on the threat of nuclear retaliation — was a perilous gamble with humanity’s future. Today, that gamble is far more dangerous, and Congress has not meaningfully examined it. For eight decades, nuclear deterrence has served as the foundation of U.S. security policy. It is often described as sober, realistic and time‑tested. But deterrence is not a law of nature. It is a theory built on assumptions about human behavior, technology and geopolitics that no longer match the world we live in. Experts increasingly argue that the post-Cold War period, often perceived as stable, was actually an anomaly in which unusually strong buffers masked a brittle deterrence system that produced multiple near‑misses. T