Since the advent of nuclear-powered vessels, nuclear and maritime security have been closely intertwined. The introduction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) has further complicated the relationship. An increasing number of countries rely on SSBNs to maintain credible second-strike capabilities, the foundation of nuclear deterrence. The proliferation of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) adds another layer of complexity. SSNs are often regarded as effective platforms for countering SSBNs, given their stealth capabilities in the underwater domain. Indeed, one of the primary motivations for countries, including those without nuclear weapons, to acquire SSNs is their "hunter-killer" capability, which enables them to counter underwater threats and maintain a favourable balance of power in the maritime domain and in an escalation dominance scenario. Yet an SSN fleet capable of tracking an adversary’s SSBNs can create pressures that may escalate a crisis amongst nuclear-armed states. The Asia-Pacific region has become a focal point for the growing interconnectedne