When U.S. and Israeli airstrikes killedIran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, they were not just removing the head of the regime but also the leader of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” a network that includesHezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, which has historically served as Tehran’s forward-defense network.
On day two of the campaign, Hezbollah and several Iraqi militias joined attacks against Israel and U.S. interests. The Houthis have so far limited their response to political support and public mobilization.
The Houthis are one of Iran’s principal proxies, whose primary role has been to harass ships in the Red Sea at Iran’s direction. For more than a decade, the IRGC Navy has maintained a forward presence of commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, serving asauxiliary intelligenceships, collecting intelligence on international shipping and disseminating it to the Houthis.
By fusing all-source intelligence with Automatic Identification System data gathered from transiting vessels, these ships maintained an accurate maritime activity plot that could be passed to the Houthis to facilitate targeting. U.S. officials say Iran used the vessel MV Behshad specifically to provide thattargeting information. The Behshad operated as an intelligence, command, and control center to help carry out strikes beyond the horizon, closing a technology gap in Houthi capabilities.
The U.S. conducted a cyberattack against the vessel in February 2024 to inhibit its ability to share intelligence with Houthi rebels. After the vessel’s departure from the region, Houthi attacks dropped sharply, from an average of19 attacksper month during the first phase of the campaign to eight strikes in the period following its withdrawal.
During the campaign, the Houthis turned theBab al-Mandabchokepoint into an anti-access/area-denial zone, conducting more than one hundred attacks against commercial ships and warships since November 2023. The campaign expanded in phases, beginning with Israel-linked vessels, then ships heading to Israeli ports, and later vessels linked to the United States and Britain.
The Red Sea andBab al-Mandab Straitlink European and Mediterranean markets with Asia via the Suez Canal, carrying roughly10–15 percentof global seaborne trade under normal conditions. During the Houthi campaign, major container lines and tanker operators rerouted vessels around southern Africa, adding approximately 10–14 days to voyages and increasing fuel costs.
Transits through the Bab al-Mandab hit a record low in June 2025, down 65 percent from June 2023. Eilat port halted operations, and Suez Canal revenues dropped. The Houthis’ real strength lies not in the volume of their arsenal but in their ability to sustain a high perception of risk.
In previous confrontations between Israel, Iran, and the United States from 2023 to 2025, the Houthis participated in “solidarity strikes,” launching missiles and drones and enforcing a maritime blockade around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, targeting Israeli-linked shipping, U.S. warships, and commercial vessels. This time, Abdulmalik al-Houthi has appeared three times since the outbreak of the war. In his first speech, he declared solidarity with Iran and affirmed readiness for “all developments.”
His second speech, following the announcement of Khamenei’s assassination, was more emotional, offering condolences to the Iranian people and reaffirming support for Tehran, though he again refrained from committing to military action. A third speech reinforced the same message. In none of the three did the group issue a clear declaration of military intervention, as it had done in past conflicts. He also called for mass demonstrations in Yemen in solidarity with the Iranian people.
Source: The Gateway Pundit
