As the United States intensifies its aggressive posture toward both Cuba and Iran and just a month and a half since Venezuela’sNicolas Maduro’snegotiatedabduction,
China and Russia areseeminglysteppingforwardwithoffersofassistancethat would seem to offer Havana apathwayto survival.
China and Russia, increasingly coordinated in their opposition to American hegemony — something not seen since before the sino soviet split — have extended multiple offers of assistance to the island nation. To be clear I’m not stating China and Russia are an anti-US force nor that they seek a fight with the US, nonetheless they are cultivating their capacities to withstand and defend themselves and their interests more and more as multipolarity develops. Yet Cuba appears curiously reluctant to fully embrace these potential lifelines, raising fundamental questions about Havana’s strategic calculations in this new cold war environment.
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Cuba’s engagement with the intergovernmental association that is BRICS and through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) created by China, has been a subject of interest for many observers who question the extent of the benefits derived from these partnerships. China’s BRI presence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) counts with over twenty countries in the region having signed up, which presents an opportunity for Cuba to engage in infrastructure development and trade relationships. Last year Iwrotean article that tracks relevant recent Cuban-BRICS relations to ascertain the geoeconomic progress and how the relations may develop, but the question remains, does Cuba actually want to diversify with the multipolar giants?
Recently, at the recent Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State,Marco Rubiodelivereda wholly neocon speech outlining an imperial American project across the globe and specially in the western hemisphere in a bid to resist and pushback the systemic transition to multipolarity. Perhaps most importantly, despite the tightening US siege, significant elements within the Cuban government and elite are still hoping to cut a deal with Washington. There are strong indications that unofficial talks are taking place between the Cuban leadership and the Trump administration, with Marco Rubio playing a central role but Cuba should know by now that the US will be interpreting the islands actions as weakness hence why it’s in its present predicament.
For Cuba, this has translated into tangible offers of assistance as Russia has openly committed to sending oil to alleviate the island’s crippling energy crisis that has worsened since the US blockade which ended Venezuelan shipments and by designating Cuba as a threat to US national security while China is dispatching aircraft loaded with food, rice, and solar panels. Yet despite these gestures, Cuba’s enthusiasm for deepening ties with Moscow and Beijing appears tepid at best.
This hesitation is particularly puzzling given Cuba’s revolutionary history as the revolution’s greatest social achievements, universal literacy, its world-renowned healthcare system, were built on the back of Soviet economic assistance. One might expect deep reservoirs of gratitude and practical understanding of how such partnerships function. Instead, Cuba has repeatedly turned away Russian and also Chinese overtures over the past decade.
Understanding this apparent self-sabotage requires examining internal Cuban politics. During the post-Soviet period, Cuba pivoted toward tourism from Canada and Europe and relied heavily on Venezuelan oil under favorable terms from Caracas. These arrangements created powerful domestic constituencies with vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Yet as things change why does Cuba believe non global powers from the western orbit themselves can help it prosper amid tension with the US?
Cuban tourism officials may well have worried that a visible Russian return would deter Western visitors. Those benefiting from the Venezuelan oil trade, which involved profitable resale on international markets, had little incentive to see Russian energy supplies disrupt their arrangements. Unlike duringFidel Castro’sera, when a single strong leader could override sectoral interests, today’s fragmented Cuban leadership appears unable to make the difficult decisions necessary to pivot decisively toward new strategic partners, even if only to balance among great powers, for as it stands Cuba seems to think appeasing the US will be enough to safeguard the survival of its government.
Source: Global Research
