At the Davos Forum last month, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said that the international system is “in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.” While his remarks never directly mentioned the United States, they reflect changes to geopolitics that are being accelerated by the Donald Trump administration. They also frame the challenges countries like Korea face in an evolving international environment.

To understand what is happening in U.S. policy, Washington’s relationship with Europe is informative, especially the recent drama over Greenland.

Nominally, President Donald Trump framed taking over Greenland in terms of strengthening Arctic and U.S. national security, while preventing Russia or China from gaining a foothold on the strategic island. But the United States has always had options short of territorial concessions to achieve its national security goals. Under a 1951 agreement on the defense of Greenland with Denmark, the United States can already deploy troops and weapons to the island. Greenland also falls under NATO’s Article V, meaning any attack would draw a response from NATO allies as well.

Trump’s initial decision to threaten force and additional tariffs to gain sovereignty over Greenland risked fracturing NATO and sending the world speeding down a path where the rules-based order that has deeply benefited countries like Korea becomes undone.

While the rules-based order has always had exceptions for the United States, it was built on an understanding that Washington would refrain from exploiting weaker states to maximize its interests. The United States accepted this restraint. Two world wars had taught Washington that competition for territory and resources resulted in bloodshed on a global scale. Rather than continuing down that path, it sought to build a stable order.

The U.S. would provide public goods such as collective security to maintain peace, while ensuring open sea lanes and reducing barriers to trade to create opportunities for wider economic prosperity. Seizing Greenland from a NATO ally would have ended the idea that the United States would constrain itself or work to maintain the public good that supports the current international system.

A world of great powers untethered from rule of law is a more dangerous world for Korea. It is also a world where there is little to inhibit the continuing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, further weakening security on the Korean Peninsula.

The degradation of the international system also permeates to the bilateral level. When the EU suspended ratification of the new U.S.-EU trade agreement in response to U.S. actions towards Greenland, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer suggested that the EU needed to “compartmentalize” the two issues.

The actions against Europe help to explain Trump’s new tariff threats against Korea. While they may be tied to Seoul’s speed in implementing the new U.S.-Korea trade agreement, they are designed to advance U.S. objectives and impose costs. In future disputes, Korea will be expected to “compartmentalize,” as U.S. interests shift and new tariffs are applied.

Even if Trump can be managed bilaterally with flattery and concessions, his actions loosen the norms against the use of force and economic coercion. This makes it increasingly acceptable for Trump to engage in future coercion. Trump is also creating precedents for China. Beijing previously used economic coercion over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system. Trump’s use of tariffs to pressure Korea to move more quickly on trade and against European allies over Greenland will create expanding space for China to use economic coercion in its interest.

Source: Korea Times News