[Author’s Note:The article below, first published by GR in March 2022, focuses mainly on the effects of the Russian climate on Nazi Germany’s invasion of the USSR. Although it was not very clear at the time, Operation Barbarossa was in major trouble by the latter half of October 1941. Yet on the 23rd of that month, according to historian Goodspeed, the Germans were just 40 miles from Moscow and by the end of November 1941 panzer formations had advanced to about 18 miles from the Russian capital. During the first two weeks of November 1941, however, as the German invasion had then largely stalled, the Soviet hierarchy took advantage of the situation by sending new divisions from the USSR’s interior to the Moscow region. These fresh forces performed an important role in stopping the German advance in late 1941. —Shane Quinn, February 17, 2026]

A sometimes overlooked factor which influenced the Nazi-Soviet War is the effects of the weather, chiefly the rain, ice and snow, the type of conditions for which the Russian or Soviet climate was famous for.

It must be mentioned, however, that the adverse climatic situation had started to impact on the Nazi-led invasion in October 1941, four months into the attack, whenAdolf Hitler‘s forces had by then expected to be victorious, but instead were pressed for time. The weather only became an issue because the invasion had not gone as planned.

Why were the Germans pressed for time? In the main because of the strategic blunders, committed by the German high command and Hitler; between the dates of 22 June 1941 when the invasion was launched across an enormously broad front, which ultimately weakened the force of the blow; and on 21 August 1941, when Hitler postponed the advance on the all important Moscow for a month and a half, sending his divisions to the north (Leningrad) and south (the Ukraine) in what proved a critical mistake.

Taking these causes into account, the suggestion is inaccurate that either heavy rainfall, or freezing cold, were primarily responsible forOperation Barbarossa‘s failure. Before analysing German misfortune regarding the weather, it can be noted that Hitler initially got lucky with what he believed, to the end, was the late start of his invasion.

Barbarossa had been scheduled to commence on 15 May 1941, but this was too early for an attack on Russia to proceed (Goodspeed, The German Wars, p. 390). Having not been informed of the relevant weather reports, Hitler was unaware that the spring of 1941 was exceptionally wet in the western USSR, including the eastern half of Poland, which the USSR occupied as part of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Many of the Polish-Russian river valleys were still flooded in late May and early June 1941, such as the strategically placed Bug river, which flows for almost 500 miles across Poland, western Ukraine and south-western Belarus. Barbarossa, therefore, could not have been successfully executed until weeks after 1 June 1941.

Due to the April 1941 Wehrmacht offensives in Yugoslavia and Greece, the attack on the Soviet Union was delayed for 5 and a half weeks (38 days). It has been claimed down the years that this hold up was fatal to German plans, an attractive idea, but something quite different is the case. Military historianDonald J. Goodspeedobserved “since the initial thrust had to go rapidly to yield the best results, Hitler probably gained more than he lost by the postponement”.

This was because the ground in the western Soviet Union had dried out by 22 June 1941. There were no overflowing rivers or flooded fields in sight. The hard, flat surfaces were suitable for the panzer formations to advance relatively unhindered, at 30 miles per hour, inflicting terrible damage on the Soviet military. German Army Group Centre reached the Belarusian capital of Minsk, on just day 6 of the invasion. In the weeks to come the strategic errors and, to a lesser extent, growing Soviet resistance, the vast terrain and poor weather would lead to the slowing of the German advance.

Overall, the Red Army’s performance in 1941 and into 1942 was decidedly inept, many of its divisions suffering from poor morale and training. This was not the typical Soviet soldier’s fault. The culpability lay mainly with Joseph Stalin, for decimating the Red Army high command of experienced officers with his purges. British scholar Evan Mawdsleynoted, “Many Soviet soldiers fought badly in 1941 or surrendered without a fight, demoralized troops in a demoralized society”.

Source: Global Research