Today, the emergence of such a law on the national agenda is a belated yet strategically extremely important step. Because the issue is no longer merely a matter of the law of the sea.

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When the concept of the Blue Homeland emerged in June 2006, one of the most critical periods of decline and siege in the history of Türkiye’s maritime geopolitics was being experienced. However, the origin of this process was not only in the 2000s, but also much further, especially in the 1970s, to the continental shelf crises that started in the Aegean Sea. In fact, the maritime jurisdiction struggle that Türkiye is experiencing today is not a problem that emerged suddenly. Throughout the history of the Republic, Türkiye has acted with a land-centered security approach for a long time, and the seas have often been considered as secondary strategic areas.

During the Cold War, Türkiye’s security reflex was largely shaped around land defense, as it was positioned against the Soviet threat on NATO’s southern flank. The seas were mostly discussed from the perspective of transport, fisheries and coastal security. However, the world was changing, energy transportation, subsea natural resources, maritime trade routes, data cables, offshore energy infrastructures and strait security were bringing the seas back to the center of great power competition. While maritime transportation formed the backbone of the globalizing economy, the energy and data lines under the sea were becoming the new geopolitical veins of states. Türkiye, on the other hand, although surrounded by seas on three sides, has not been able to adequately read this transformation at the strategic level for many years.

The period when Türkiye experienced the first major break in maritime jurisdiction areas in the Aegean was the 1970s. After the OPEC oil crisis in 1973, interest in the hydrocarbon potential in the Aegean Sea increased rapidly. The two countries came seriously face to face for the first time after Greece started unilateral attempts to explore the continental shelf in the Aegean without taking into account Türkiye’s rights.

For Türkiye, the issue was not only the oil exploration license. The problem was based on whether not the islands in the Aegean would produce maritime jurisdiction areas. This crisis showed that the Aegean is no longer just a political problem between two NATO allies but has turned into a direct issue of geopolitical sovereignty. In 1976, the crisis escalated after the activities of Türkiye’s research vessel Hora (MTA Sismik-1) and the issue was brought to the international agenda. The Bern MOU, which was signed in the same year and froze the problem until today, was actually one of the first important documents of Türkiye’s will to manage the continental shelf problem in the Aegean on legal and political grounds. The essence of the Bern MOU was that the parties should avoid unilateral steps in the Aegean continental shelf and were invited to try to solve the problem through negotiations. This agreement was very important for Türkiye. Because it functioned as a political brake mechanism that prevented Greece from creating a fait accompli in the Aegean.

However, in the following years, the Athens administration moved away from the spirit of this agreement and continued its policies aimed at creating a de facto situations in the Aegean, forcing Turkiye’s reactions. A significant part of the crises experienced today are actually the continuation of the continental shelf dispute that started in 1976 and has never been fully resolved. For this reason, it is necessary to read the problems in the Aegean not only in terms of current crises, but also in terms of strategic continuity of nearly half a century.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) introduced a new global maritime order that fundamentally transformed the classical law of the sea. Beyond territorial waters, the convention placed concepts such as the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), contiguous zone, offshore regime and deep-sea mining at the center of international politics and state sovereignty. From that point onward, states no longer viewed the seas merely as navigation routes, but increasingly as strategic spaces tied to seabed hydrocarbons, fisheries, biological wealth, maritime trade routes and underwater economic resources.

However, the regime established by UNCLOS created serious problems for Türkiye, particularly regarding the maritime jurisdiction generated by islands. The Aegean is not an ordinary sea. It is a semi-enclosed and highly unique geography filled with hundreds of islands, islets and rocks situated directly opposite the Anatolian mainland. If the convention is interpreted in the maximalist manner advocated by Greece, Türkiye’s vast mainland coastline in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean would effectively be deprived of equitable maritime jurisdiction areas, confining Türkiye to narrow coastal waters despite possessing one of the longest continental coastlines in the region.

Source: Global Research