Cartel members are not always a congenial bunch. Relations can get frosty and brittle over time. With the United Arab Emirates, membership of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has not been without its troubles, not helped by the increasingly snarky relationship it shares with the group’s de facto leader, Saudi Arabia. To be part of such a group entails mindful restraint, an understanding about production targets and a curbing of individual initiative. Thestatuteof the group states its goal: to “devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilisation of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.”

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The group has been battered of late, notably in the field of diminished supply. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz arising from the Iran War saw a fall of almost 8 million barrels of oil per day in March, a 27.5% decline from February numbers. Supply falls were registered in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Iraq. The fall for the UAE was in the order of 1.5 million barrels a day. But the Emirates has also suffered punishing barrages from Iranian missile and drone attacks, a problem officials feel has beeninadequately addressedby such groups as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League.

On May April 28, the UAEannouncedit was exiting OPEC and the umbrella OPEC+ organisation “effective 1 May 2026.” (The departure follows that of Qatar in 2019, when its priorities shifted to the pursuit of natural gas.) The decision reflected, in the hideous, dead jargon of middle management, “the UAE’s long-term strategic and economic vision and evolving energy profile, including accelerated investment in domestic energy production, and reinforces its commitment to a responsible, reliable, and forward-looking role in global energy markets.”

The usual anodyne, non-committal commitments are noted. “Following its exit, the UAE will continue to act responsibly, bringing additional production to market in a gradual, measured manner, aligned with demand and market conditions.” The decision did not alter the state’s “commitment to global market stability or its approach based on cooperation with producers and consumers.” Instead, it enhanced the “ability to respond to evolving market needs.”

Behind this abominable language lies a less than obscured objective. The UAE has been the country with the second highest spare production capacity in OPEC. Being so placed, it was a runner-up in terms of influencing production levels to ease oil prices. Under the quota restrictions of the group, the state was limited to 3 to 3.5 million barrels per day, a threshold that effectively meant lost revenue. Inwords spokentoThe New York Times, the country’s energy minister,Suhail Al Mazrouei,

“The world needs more energy, the world needs more resources and UAE wanted to be unconstrained by any groups.”

The inevitable commentary on the implications of the UAE’s exit has followed. The BBC economics editor, Faisal Islam,pondersthem:

“It’s not just that the UAE, when it can get its oil fully back on the market by sea or pipeline, is likely to target 5 million barrels per day production. Saudi Arabia might respond with an oil price war that the UAE’s more diversified economy could withstand, but poorer OPEC members might not.”

Source: Global Research