The Balkan War was not an ordinary military defeat but the final stage of the Ottoman Empire’s long political, strategic and moral collapse.
To read this article in the following languages, click theTranslate Websitebutton below the author’s name.
Türkçe, Farsi, Русский, Español, Portugues, عربي, Hebrew, 中文,Français, Deutsch, Italiano, 日本語,한국어, Српски. And 40 more languages.
Before the end of the Italian War, which started in 1911, the Balkan states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) attacked the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, who could not achieve technological and socio-political development, were forced to retreat not only militarily but also politically and administratively since the second half of the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire, as a farmer/peasant agricultural empire, was attacked in every field after the 1877 Ottoman-Russian War.
Although the Balkan War, which was started by Montenegro on October 8, 1912, is generally considered as a staggering loss of territory in the Turkish military history literature, from a strategic perspective, this war is the total systemic collapse of the state mechanism and defense doctrine. When the war began, enemy intelligence was almost non-existent. Most of the soldiers were demobilized. The Ottoman soldiers were around 450,000 against the enemy’s 700,000 soldiers. But the most important issue was the lack of provisions and clothes.
On the other hand, the number of cavalries was extremely low. As a result of the Italian war that has been going on for a year, the financial situation has deteriorated considerably, and when the Balkan war broke out, the Italians were hastily asked for an armistice and peace agreement. As a result, Libya and 12 islands were left to the Italians and the war in the Balkans was intervened. This war is the greatest tragedy of the Ottoman Empire during its collapse. In the Balkan War, not only four former Ottoman provinces were fought. Behind Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro were the great powers of Europe.
Image: Mustafa Kemal (Public Domain)
When the Balkan War began,Mustafa Kemalwas still a young staff officer, but he saw the real cause of the disaster very early. According to him, it was not only about the success of the Montenegrin, Bulgarian, Serbian or Greek armies. The main issue was that the Ottoman army was drawn into politics over the years and collapsed from within. As a matter of fact, in his later evaluations, he would emphasize that the Balkan defeat was not a direct defeat of the Turkish soldiers. The army was no longer an institution of national war and was drawn into the harsh political factionalization of the period, especially the Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) circle. The Freedom and Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilaf) line that developed against this and the opposition structures such as the Halaskâr Zabitan (The Savior Officers) also created deep divisions among the officer cadres. The officers gradually began to align themselves not around a common national goal, but around different political centers and factions. Political loyalty came to the fore instead of merit in promotions, commanders did not trust each other, and the chain of command was eroded more and more every day. The crumbling structure had exhausted the spirit of the army and navy even before the Balkan War began. Therefore, the war was actually lost at the headquarters, not at the front.
The Balkan War caused the Ottomans to be besieged from the west, the consequences of which are reflected until today, with the loss of the Aegean Islands and Western Thrace. The Ottoman Empire lost the Aegean Islands one after the other within 5 months (October 21, 1912-March 16, 1913). The main reason for this was not only the lack of a navy. It was the lack of a maritime state reflex. This reflex defines the sea not just as a border or an obstacle, but as the main strategic artery that ensures the survival of the state, its logistical sustainability and its geopolitical depth. The maritime reflex of the Ottoman Empire weakened and regressed after Lepanto (1571) sea battle and finally disappeared completely during the reign of the Sultan Abdulhamid II. While the Italian War was going on in an overseas area, not a single navy ship could be sent to Libya to support the war. The Parliament, which convened in Istanbul before the start of the Balkan War, paralyzed our will for control in the Aegean Sea by granting the naval supremacy to Greece from the very beginning. This strategic gap in the sea, just like the Italian War in Libya, triggered the abandonment of the Turkish population on the islands that have belonged to us in the Aegean for 5 centuries, and also blocked the logistics veins of the land armies. This logistical shortfall left our troops in Rumelia (Balkans) without ammunition.
In the Balkan War, there was even a division between the Fleet Headquarters and the Ministry of Navy. Some of the officers were from the Unionist group, some from the Freedom and Entente group. Aside from the deficiencies and weaknesses, the incompetence and division in the command structure made the situation much more serious.
Source: Global Research
