Leaders from Canada and Germany have begun openly mourning what they describe as the collapse of the so-called rules-based international order, acknowledging its inherent flaws and the brute force that once underpinned it. In recent speeches, Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada and Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany highlighted how this system, long portrayed as an objective framework of laws and norms, was always more a product of hegemonic power than universal principles.
Speaking on January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Carney expressed Canada's sorrow over the system's demise. He conceded that the rules-based order “was partially false, that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically, and we knew that international law applied with varied rigour, depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.” Carney warned that clinging to illusions of mutual benefit is untenable, stating, “You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.”
Carney's remarks reflect a broader disillusionment among U.S. allies, who have long benefited from security guarantees, defense pacts, and trade deals under the umbrella of American dominance. The source article from Global Research argues that this order was never truly objective but rather enforced by might, with non-compliant states facing coercion—a reality often shielded from or ignored by Washington's partners.
On February 13, at the annual Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz echoed these sentiments, explaining the event's grumpy motto: “under destruction.” He declared that the order of rights and rules was “currently being destroyed,” adding that “even in its heyday [it] no longer exists.” Merz pointed to external threats, citing “Russia’s violent revisionism” and its war in Ukraine, as well as China’s “strategic patience” that could soon place it “on an equal footing with the United States in military terms.”
Merz avoided direct criticism of the United States, instead lamenting the challenge to its leadership—a era that had suited Europe's “lotus eaters.” He noted that Germany had “haughtily ‘criticised violations of the international order all over the world’ without having ‘the means to solve the problem.’” Calling for adaptation, the chancellor urged a “mental transformation” away from “hegemonial fantasies” toward “leadership and partnership.”
These eulogies underscore a shifting global landscape where the U.S.-led system's beneficiaries are confronting its fragility. The source material portrays the “rules-based order” as a “figment of legal draughtsmanship,” sustained not by impartial laws but by the power of the dominant hegemon, now facing recalcitrant challengers.
As Europe and its allies grapple with this reality, the speeches signal a reluctant awakening to the discomforting truth: without might to enforce them, rules hold no sway. Carney and Merz's admissions mark the thinning of long-held pretenses about an eternally binding international framework.
