Wars are revealing in many ways, but few reveal the moral character of a state more starkly than the choice of targets. In any conflict, both sides shoot. The question of who they shoot at, and why, is what separates one kind of state from another. The five days ofOperation Sindooroffer one of the clearest contrasts of recent memory. India struck terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan strucka Hindu temple in Jammu, a Sikh gurdwara in Poonch, and Christian convents along the border. The asymmetry was not accidental. It was a window into how each state thinks about its neighbour.
On the night of May 6 to 7, 2025, India launched precision strikes on nine specific locations. Four were in Pakistan proper: Bahawalpur, headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed; Muridke, the operational base of Lashkar-e-Taiba; Sialkot; and Sarjal in the Sialkot region. Five were in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir: Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Bhimber, Gulpur, and Barnala. Each of these had been identified through Indian intelligence as a terror camp or training facility. The strikes were carried out using Rafale jets armed with SCALP missiles and HAMMER bombs, and were completed within roughly twenty-five minutes.
India released satellite imagery and drone footage of the strikes within hours. The footage showed structures associated with terrorist groups, not military bases or civilian areas. Indian briefings stated explicitly that Pakistani military establishments had not been targeted. The press conference held by Indian officials on May 7 emphasised that the response was focused, measured, and non-escalatory. The Indian government repeated this position in subsequent briefings and provided journalists with evidence in the form of imagery, coordinates, and damage assessments.
The choice to strike only terrorist infrastructure, in spite of the option to escalate against Pakistani military targets, was deliberate. India was making a public, visible distinction between the Pakistani state's military and the terror groups it harbours. The implicit offer was that Pakistan's regular forces would not be targeted, provided that Pakistan did not escalate. When Pakistan did escalate, India did expand its target list to include Pakistani airbases, but only after Pakistan's actions had made that escalation unavoidable.
Pakistan's response, launched on the night of May 7 to 8 and continuing through May 10 under the operational name Bunyan-um-Marsoos, was structurally different. According to multiple Indian briefings, Pakistan deployed between 300 and 400 drones, primarily Turkish-made Asisguard Songar and Bayraktar models, against 36 Indian locations from Leh to Sir Creek. The targets included Indian airbases, but they also included civilian and religious sites that had no military function whatsoever.
The Shambhu Temple in Jammu was attacked. The Gurdwara in Poonch was attacked. Christian convents along the border belt were struck or attempted. In Poonch, Pakistani artillery fire on May 8 killed at least 13 civilians, hit schools, and damaged the gurdwara directly. None of these locations had any conceivable military value. They were not used by Indian forces. They were not associated with strategic infrastructure. The only thing they had in common was their religious significance.
The Indian government's official briefing on the contrast was direct. Pakistan, it stated, was using drones and shelling to target religious sites in a deliberate attempt to break India's communal harmony. These were not random strikes. They were part of a plan to break India's unity. The targeting was designed to provoke a domestic Indian response that would translate the military conflict into communal violence between Indian Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians.
Pakistan's targeting was designed to provoke a domestic Indian response that would translate the military conflict into communal violence. India refused to take the bait.
The asymmetry between India's targeting and Pakistan's targeting reflects something deeper than tactical choice. It reflects two distinct theories about the nature of the conflict.
India's theory, expressed in the Modi government's strategic communications throughout the operation, was that Pakistan-based terrorism is a structural problem rooted in specific groups, specific compounds, and specific commanders. Eliminate those, and the threat diminishes. The theory does not require attacks on Pakistani civilians, religious sites, or non-military infrastructure. The terrorist groups have addresses. The strikes simply needed to land at those addresses.
Source: India Latest News, Breaking News Today, Top News Headlines | Times Now
