Sudan’s allegation that Ethiopia and the UAE attacked its main airport on Monday from Bahir Dar’s, the capital of Ethiopia’s neighboring Amhara region, prompted afurious diplomatic reactionfrom Ethiopia.
Ethiopia reminded Sudan of its continued support for “Tigray People’s Liberation Front” (TPLF) mercenaries, the former core of the previous ruling coalition that sparked theNorthernConflictfrom 2020-2022, and other anti-Ethiopian forces. Sudan was also accused of doing this at its patrons’ behest.
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Regional dynamics have become much more complicated since the end of the aforementioned conflict, but readers can review these three analyseshere,here, andhereto get a better understanding of them. To oversimplify, Ethiopia’s Egyptian rival is Sudan’s top patron as well as the patron of Ethiopia’s Eritrean rival, and Egypt is vying with Turkiye for the same role vis-à-vis Somalia. All three have problems with Ethiopia so a three-front proxy war against it orchestrated by Egypt can’t be ruled out.
Saudi Arabia has recently emerged as Sudan’s second most important patron, and it’s also recently revived its rivalry with the UAE, which is one of Ethiopia’s primary strategic partners. The UAE has been accused of being the rebel “Rapid Support Forces’” (RSF) top patron, the other actor in the Sudanese War, while Ethiopia and neighboring South Sudan have been accused of aiding it too. All three deny the allegations. Al Jazeera reported in mid-April that the Sudanese War is now “locked in a military impasse”.
Given Ethiopia’s concerns about an Egyptian-orchestrated three-front proxy war, it’s unlikely to allow its territory to be used as a staging ground for RSF attacks in Sudan which could make that worst-case scenario an inevitability, especially since this could divide its forces from the Eritrean front. The timing of Sudan’s allegation is also suspicious since it comes right after the UAEwithdrewfrom Saudi-dominated OPEC. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as can be seen, therefore have their reasons to pit Sudan against Ethiopia.
Egypt’s are to divide its Ethiopian rival’s forces from the Eritrean front while Saudi Arabia’s are to punish its Emirati rival for withdrawing from OPEC by causing problems for its Ethiopian strategic partner. Eritrea, which functions as the TPLF’s most direct patron with Egyptian financial and military support, has influence over Sudan nowadays too and will never miss an opportunity to turn anyone against its Ethiopian rival. Landlocked Ethiopia is also more vulnerable than ever amidst the global energy crisis.
The pieces have therefore fallen into place from Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s perspectives for pitting their Sudanese proxy against Ethiopia, which has decent ties with Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia is still prioritizing its rivalry with the UAE over its ties with Ethiopia. This analysis doesn’t mean that an Ethio-Sudanese War orchestrated by those two is imminent, nor the worst-case three-front one, just that they saw an opportunity to advance their interests over their respective rivals via Sudan and promptly took it.
Egypt wants to weaken Ethiopia with the ultimate goal of “Balkanizing”it, or at least internally shattering it into a collection of de facto independent statelets that could be divided-and-ruled, while Saudi Arabia wants to inflict another symbolic defeat on the UAE after recentlychasing it out of South Yemen. If they go too far or lose control of the military-strategic dynamics, then a major regional conflict could erupt, so the stakes are extremely high. Now would be a good time for Russia, China, or the US to offer mediation.
Source: Global Research
